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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Saiyoth Tom Chongphaisane appeals from the restitution order following his
sentence on possession of methamphetamine.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The presentence report (PSI) sets forth the factual basis of Chongphaisane's
conviction for possession of methamphetamine as follows:
In summary, the reports reflect that on August 30, 2011, officers obtained
a search warrant for 815 S. Curtis Road 21 in Boise after receiving a
complaint about possible drug sales. Saiyoth Chongphaisane came to the
door and opened it. Also in the home were Melodee Gray and Alvin Leroy
Palin ,Jr. Gray denied any knowledge of drug use in the trailer, but track
marks were located on her arms. She later admitted she had been using
recently and had a bag of new needles/syringes in the trailer.
Chongphaisane acknowledged he had been unemployed for about 2 or 3
weeks and was selling methamphetamine. He first started selling a small
amount making $25 to $50 per transaction. He stated he was going to try
to buy an 8 ball worth of methamphetamine for $240. He said he usually
just tries to help people out by getting them methamphetamine and
sometimes uses the money he makes to help them fix their cars. He also
claimed he gave money to people to buy cigarettes or beer for himself. A
glass methamphetamine pipe, a digital scale with two metal weights, and
a zip lock baggie with a white crystal substance were located in his room.
A bowl with green leafy substance was also located that tested
presumptively positive for marijuana. Chongphaisane gave consent to
search his phone which appeared to have text messages indicating
possible drug sales.
(PSI, p.2.)
The state charged Chongphaisane with possession of methamphetamine,
possession of marijuana (misdemeanor), and possession of drug paraphernalia.
pp.20-21.)

(R.,

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Chongphaisane entered a guilty plea to

possession of methamphetamine, and the two misdemeanor charges were dismissed.
1

(R., pp.27-34.) Prior to sentencing, the district court released the state from making the
recommendation set forth in the plea agreement because Chongphaisane was charged
with new offenses. (R., p.40.) The district court sentenced Chongphaisane to a unified
seven year term with two years fixed, and recommended that he be placed in the
therapeutic community or work center. (R., pp.42-47.) The court subsequently ordered
restitution of $3,018.21. (R., pp. 69-70.) Chongphaisane filed a notice of appeal timely
from the entry of judgment. (R., pp.49-51.)

2

ISSUES
Chongphaisane states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court erred by allowing the State to include the
fringe benefits of employment in the calculation of "regular salaries"
at the restitution hearing.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by reopening, not
once, but three times, the restitution hearing as the State provided
Chongphaisane no valid justification to reopen the hearing so as to
present additional evidence which it could have, but did not present
during the initial hearing.

3.

Whether the district court erred in awarding restitution in this case
because there was insufficient evidence to support the restitution
award.

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Chongphaisane failed to show any error in regard to the district court's restitution
order?

3

ARGUMENT
Chongphaisane Has Failed To Show Any Error In Regard To The District Court's
Restitution Order
A.

Introduction
At Chongphaisane's sentencing hearing, the district court left the amount of

restitution open. (1/11/12 Tr., p.19, Ls.19-20.) At the subsequent restitution hearing,
held February 15, 2012, the state presented testimony by Boise City Police Officer
Steve Keely and Boise City Police technician Laura Weddle to support its request for
restitution based on the hours spent investigating the case by nine law enforcement
personnel. (2/15/12 Tr., p.6, L.19

p.33, L.2; St. Ex. 1.) State's Exhibit 1 listed and

totaled the officers' (and Ms. Weddle's) hours spent investigating Chongphaisane's
case and requested restitution totaling $2,918.21. (St's Ex. 1.)
Ms. Weddle testified that when she prepared the restitution request, she applied
(i.e., multiplied) the rate of pay for each of the officers as of August 30 th of 2011 (the
date the search warrant was executed) to the officers' stated hours, which resulted in
$2,918 as the total restitution amount. (2/15/12 Tr., p.24, L.23 - p.25, L.19.) Although
Officer Keely and Ms. Weddle testified to what their own hourly rates of pay were, they
were unable to say what the rates of pay were for the other seven members of law
enforcement listed on the restitution request. (2/15/12 Tr., p.6, L.19 - p.33, L.2.) At the
end of the restitution hearing, after the court noted that Chongphaisane's attorney had
brought that alleged omission to light earlier (2/15/12 Tr., p.43, L.24 - p.44, L.2; see id.,
p.34, Ls.7-15; p.37, Ls.5-8), the prosecutor stated:
Your Honor, I did not elicit the dollar figure per officer. I asked her if
she had those figures in front of her and applied them accurately as to the

4

number of hours the officers provided. If Your Honor does not think that is
sufficient, I would move to reopen.
(2/15/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.3-8.) The district court granted the prosecutor's request to reopen
its presentation of testimony without any objection by Chongphaisane.

(2/15/12 Tr.,

p.44, L.9.)
In her reopened testimony, Ms. Weddle again acknowledged that, when she
calculated the "total number of dollars" requested on State's Exhibit 1 (i.e., $2,918.21),
she used "an accurate rate of pay for each of the officers listed on the spread sheet for
August 30 th of 2011 [,]" and "multiplied that figure by the number of hours given to [her]
by each of the officers."

(2/15/12 Tr., p.44, L.23 - p.45, L.11.) However, Ms. Weddle

testified that she did not bring the "pay schedule that the payroll department gives [her]"
to court.

Ms. Weddle explained that she receives

(2/15/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.12-15.)

quarterly payroll reports which she uses to determine what the officers' rates of pay
were at the time a search warrant is executed, 1 and, referring to State's Exhibit 1, that it
is possible some of the officers "got a raise in between the time that [she] requested
their payroll stats and the time that [she] configured this document." (2/15/12 Tr., p. 24,
Ls.3-9; p.52, L.18 - p.53, L.4.)

Upon questioning by the district court, Ms. Weddle

agreed it is possible that a pay rate used to compute restitution could be lower than an
officer's actual pay rate at the time investigation hours were rendered because a
quarterly payroll report might not reflect a more recent pay raise; conversely, "in no
event" could a restitution request be based on a pay rate that is higher than an officer's

1

Ms. Weddle further explained that she typically sends out e-mails to the team that
conducts a search warrant the day following its execution, and relies on the responses
for the number of hours spent, both regular time and overtime. (2/15/12 Tr., p.51,
Ls.15-22.)
5

pay rate at the time investigation work was performed. (2/15/12 Tr., p.52, L.21 - p.53,
L.16.) At the end of the restitution hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that the
reason she did not have Ms. Weddle "bring the pay rate is because in the state's view
her testimony that she looked at the accurate pay schedule, she did the math and she
added it up to the total figure is from our perspective enough." (2/15/12 Tr., p.55. Ls.914.) The court took the restitution matter under advisement and said it would issue a
written decision. (2/15/12 Tr., p.56, Ls.17-19.)
On February 21, 2012, the state filed an "Affidavit of Laura Weddle," which
included attachments showing the specific hours, rates of pay, and total monetary costs
for the time each of the nine law enforcement members spent investigating
Chongphaisane's case, in support of the state's request for restitution of $2,918.21. (R.,
pp.57-61.) Chongphaisane filed an objection to Ms. Weddle's affidavit (R., pp.62-64) on
the bases that it was untimely and it violated his Sixth Amendment right because, he
alleged, he "cannot cross-examine the Affidavit[,]" and he "will be effectively denied his
right to confront Ms. Weddle with respect to the information contained in the Affidavit"
(R., p.63).
The district court issued an order setting a hearing on Chongphaisane's objection
to Ms. Weddle's affidavit, and requested she be made available to testify. (R., p.65.) At
that hearing, held March 21, 2012, the district court informed the parties that the amount
of restitution would be increased to cover Ms. Weddle's court appearance that day.
(3/21/12 Tr., p.57, Ls.3-15.) Chongphaisane did not object to the hearing being held, or
to Ms. Weddle testifying at the hearing. (See generally 3/21/12 Tr., p.57, L.1 - p.66,
L.B.) After Ms. Weddle was sworn in as a witness and was asked a few preliminary

6

questions by the court, Chongphaisane's attorney declined to cross-examine her.
(3/21/12 Tr., p.59, Ls.3-15.) The court excused Ms. Weddle as a witness, and directed
her to provide it an affidavit "with regard to how much time [she] spent in order to further
increase the restitution." (3/21/12 Tr., p.59, Ls.16-20.) On March 26, 2012, the state
filed another "Affidavit of Laura Weddle," which added the costs of Ms. Weddle and
Officer Keely for testifying at the restitution hearing on February 15, 2012, and for Ms.
Weddle's court appearance on March 21, 2012, for a new restitution total of $3,061.24.
(Aug. to Record, 2 3/23/12 Aff. of Laura Weddle.) On March 30, 2012, the court entered
an Order for Restitution and Judgment ordering Chongphaisane to pay $3,018.21,
which included $1 OD.ODO for the drug enforcement donation account. 3 (Aug. to Record,
3/30/12 Order for Restitution (etc.).)
On appeal to this Court, Chongphaisane challenges the district court's restitution
order on several grounds. First, he contends the court erred by including the officers'
11

computed hourly rate for "fringe benefits" instead of their regular salary" or wages.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) This claim fails because it is contrary to the applicable
statute.

Second, he argues that the court abused its discretion by reopening the

restitution hearing to receive additional testimony and affidavits by Ms. Weddle. (Id.,
pp.16-24.) This argument fails because Chongphaisane did not object to reopening the
February 15, 2012 hearing or holding a hearing on March 21, 2012, and he has failed to
show any abuse of the district court's discretion by accepting additional testimony and
2

On October 15, 2012, this Court issued an order granting Chongphaisane's October
5, 2012 motion to augment the record on appeal.

3

The district court's restitution order did not include the $143.03 Ms. Weddle's March
21, 2012 affidavit requested for her and Officer Keely's court appearances. (See Aug.
to Record, Aff. of Laura Weddle, p.6.)
7

affidavits by Ms. Weddle. Third, Chongphaisane asserts that, based on the testimony
presented before the state rested its case at the initial hearing, there was insufficient
evidence to support the district court's restitution order. (Id., pp.24-27.) However, the
evidence and testimony presented by the state - based either upon the testimony and
evidence presented before the state initially rested its case, or in total - was more than
sufficient to support the court's restitution order.

B.

Standards Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over

which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796,
798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); Statev. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 94 P.3d 709,710
(Ct. App. 2004).
The decision to allow the state additional time to prepare a restitution request is
discretionary, and is reviewed by determining: "(1) whether the lower court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason." State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762-63, 241 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Ct. App.
2010).
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the
trial court's discretion. State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 752 (Ct. App.
2010); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). The trial court's factual

8

findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if supported by substantial
evidence. Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280.

C.

Chongphaisane Has Failed To Show That The District Court Exceeded Its Legal
Authority Under The Applicable Restitution Statute
The district court was required to act within the statutory boundaries of the

applicable restitution statutes. See State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886, 231 P.3d 529,
531 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct.
App. 2002)). The interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. State v.
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those words must be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be construed as a whole.

kl

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give

effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v.
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362,
365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996).

Here the language of the statute is clear and

unambiguous.
The applicable statute allows the state to recover "restitution for costs incurred by
law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation." I.C. § 37-2732(k). "Costs shall

include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per
diem ... , and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred,

including regular salaries of employees." Id. (emphasis added). The plain language of
this statute does not limit costs to regular salaries of investigating officers. Rather, it
allows the state to recoup all costs associated with the investigation. The language
"including regular salaries of employees," rather than being a limitation, merely makes

9

clear that allowable costs include salaries of officers, prosecutors, and support staff. At
a minimum, the statute states that restitution is not "limited to" the items specifically
listed. Therefore, just as much as hourly wages, the hourly rates paid for benefits for
police personnel are "costs incurred" by the police department in investigating
Chongphaisane's case because they are investigative "expenses actually incurred."
1.C. § 37-2732(k). 4
Even if the "regular salary" language were deemed a restriction on the restitution
allowed under I.C. § 37-2732(k), Chongphaisane has failed to cite anything that would
define "regular salary" to exclude "fringe benefits" or other compensation. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.14-15.)

Chongphaisane's reliance on the definitions of "salary" provided in

wholly unrelated and self-contained statutory schemes such as "Public Employee
Retirement System" (I.C. § 59-1300, et seq.) and "Education'' (I.C. § 33-1270, et seq.) is
not compelling.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.)

The former scheme does not

specifically exclude benefits such as medical and retirement benefits from "salary", and
the latter scheme does not define "salary."
Moreover, "salary" is commonly defined as:

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.)

"A reward or recompense for services

performed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rev. 4 th ed., 1968). "Fixed compensation
for services, paid to a person on a regular basis."

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4 th Ed. 2009).

4

Chongphaisane has

Chongphaisane's attempt to distinguish the officers' payment for benefits on the basis
that such payments "are not contingent on the work done or time spent[,]" (Appellant's
Brief, p.14) and the benefit payments will be made to them regardless of what case they
work on (id., p.15) is misplaced -- the same can be said of the officers' pay based
merely on their hourly wages (without payment for benefits).
10

failed to show that "regular salary" does not include payments by police agencies to
retirement plans like PERSI or payment for benefits such as medical insurance.
At the evidentiary hearing, the state presented evidence that the hourly rates for
the officers included both the hourly wage and benefits paid by the employing police
agency, which represented the actual expenses paid by the respective police agencies.
(2/15/12 Tr., p.24, L.3 - p.25, L.19.) The plain language of the statute allows the state
to collect all costs of the investigation, and does not exclude benefits paid to officers as
part of their salaries. Chongphaisane has failed to show any error in the district court's
decision to include payment for the hourly rate of benefits as part of the restitution
award.

D.

Chongphaisane Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Reopening The Restitution Hearing For Additional Testimony And Affidavits
Chongphaisane next contends the district court abused its discretion by

reopening the restitution hearing to receive additional testimony and affidavits by Ms.
Weddle. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-24.) However, Chongphaisane did not object to the
court allowing the state to reopen its presentation of evidence at the end of the February
15, 2012 restitution hearing, nor did he object to the court setting or holding the March
21, 2012 hearing. The only matter Chongphaisane objected to based upon timeliness
was Ms. Weddle's February 21, 2012 affidavit, which provided the same specific rates
of pay and total restitution sought for each officer and Ms. Weddle - except for the court
appearance hours for Officer Keely and Ms. Weddle - as her March 26, 2012 affidavit.
(R., pp.57-61;

Aug., 3/26/12 Aft. of Laura Weddle, p.6.)

11

It is a long standing rule in Idaho that an appellate court will not consider issues
presented for the first time on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d
1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 54-55, 910 P.2d 164, 168-69 (Ct. App.
1994); State v. Hyde, 122 Idaho 604, 605, 836 P.2d 550, 551 (Ct. App. 1992).
"Moreover, an objection on one ground will not be deemed sufficient to preserve for
appeal all objections that could have been raised." State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457,
459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. Chaffin, 92 Idaho 629, 448 P.2d
243 (1968)). Failure to raise an issue in the district court, thereby denying the trial court
the opportunity to rule on the alleged error, constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal.
Martin, 119 Idaho at 579,808 P.2d at 1324; State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,181,824
P.2d 109, 112 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450,454, 942 P.2d 574,578 (Ct. App.
1997). Chongphaisane never objected to the district court reopening the February 15,
2012 hearing or holding the March 21, 2012 hearing. Therefore, he has waived any
appellate argument that the district court abused its discretion in holding them. 5
Regardless, the district court exercised reasonable discretion in permitting the
state to present additional testimony and affidavits after the state rested its case during
the February 15, 2012 hearing.

Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) states in relevant part,

"Restitution orders shall be entered the court at the time of sentencing or such later date
as deemed necessary by the court." State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762-63, 241 P.3d

1, 5-6 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis in Jensen). That statute "contemplates that the court
5

Chongphaisane did not object to Ms. Weddle's March 26, 2012 affidavit, which
contained the same information, and more, than her earlier affidavit that was objected
to.
Because the same information contained in the challenged affidavit was
subsequently included without objection in Ms. Weddle's March 26, 2012 affidavit, there
can be no error in the district court admitting the earlier affidavit into the record.
12

may need to grant the prosecution a reasonable amount of time necessary to gather
information so as to locate all victims and correctly compute the amount of restitution,"
State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 662, 67 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis
in original).
Although Ms. Weddle testified during the initial phase of the February 15, 2012
hearing that she arrived at a total restitution amount of $2,918 by applying the correct
rate of pay for each of the officers (and herself) as of August 30th of 2011 to their stated
hours, at the end of the hearing the district court acknowledged Chongphaisane's
attorney's complaint that the specific rates of pay for each officer were not broken down
at the hearing, and allowed the prosecutor to reopen with more testimony by Ms.
Weddle.

(2/15/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.3-9.)

In her "reopened" testimony, Ms. Weddle

reiterated that although she did not bring the pay schedule that the payroll department
provides her to court, at the time she calculated the "total number of dollars" of
restitution ($2,918.21), she used "an accurate rate of pay for each of the officers listed
on the spread sheet for August 30 th of 2011 [,]" and "multiplied that figure by the number
of hours given to [her] by each of the officers."

(2/15/12 Tr., p.44, L.23 - p.45, L.15.)

At the end of the reopened hearing, the prosecutor explained that she did not have Ms.
Weddle bring the pay rates to court was she believed Ms. Weddle's testimony would be
enough - i.e., that when she (Ms. Weddle) computed the restitution amounts, she
"looked at the accurate pay schedule, she did the math and she added it up to the total
figure .... " (2/15/12 Tr., p.56, Ls.9-14.) The state filed an affidavit by Ms. Weddle six
days later, to supplement her February 15, 2012 testimony by providing the "hours

13

worked and the pay rates of involved personnel" she applied when she calculated
restitution. (R., pp.57-61.)
At the outset of the March 21, 2012 hearing, the district court acknowledged it
had "indicated to counsel that I have the inherent authority to reopen an evidentiary
proceeding to allow the Court to receive additional information where there is
information that has not yet been presented." (3/21/12 Tr., p.58, Ls.9-14.) Inasmuch as
both the district court and the defense attorney appeared to want to know the actual
rates of pay for each of the officers on the restitution list -- and not just rely on Ms.
Weddle's testimony that she had applied their accurate pay rates for the relevant time -it was reasonable for the court to allow the state to the time necessary to supplement its
restitution request with Ms. Weddle's February 21, 2012 affidavit to provide that
information. 6
Moreover, the district court did not unreasonably delay its eventual restitution
determination. 7 The sentencing hearing in Chongphaisane's case was held on January
11, 2012. (R., pp.42-44.) The restitution hearing was held on February 15, 2012, and
reopened for more testimony by Ms. Weddle that same day.

(R., pp.54-56.)

The

second hearing was conducted on March 21, 2012 after Chongphaisane objected to
Ms. Weddle's February 21, 2012 affidavit. (R., p.66, see generally 3/21/12 Tr., p.57, L.1
- p.66, L.8.) A total delay of just over two months from the sentencing hearing is hardly

6

Neither the March 21, 2012 hearing, nor Ms. Weddle's March 26, 2012 affidavit,
provided any information leading to an increase in the amount of restitution ordered
beyond that requested in Ms. Weddle's February 21, 2012 affidavit.

7

Chongphaisane's objection to Ms. Weddle's February 21, 2012 affidavit (R., pp.62-64)
stated only that, because the state had rested its case, "any information contained in the
Affidavit is untimely and should not be considered by the Court" (R., p.63).

14

the type of delay that cannot be deemed "a reasonable amount of time necessary to
gather" the more detailed information the court suggested it would like to have. See
Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 662, 67 P.3d 1271, 1274 (restitution order obtained
approximately six years after sentencing was not a reasonable amount of time
necessary to gather information and compute restitution); Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 76263, 241 P.3d 1, 5-6 (restitution order entered over six years after sentencing without
showing delay was reasonably necessary was outside court's reasonable discretion) ..
Chongphaisane has shown no abuse of discretion by the district court's decision
to allow the state a reasonable amount of time necessary to present information about
each officers' rate of pay, which the court clearly desired.

E.

The District Court's Restitution Award Was Supported By Substantial Evidence
The district court ordered Chongphaisane to pay restitution in the amount of

$2918.21 plus $100 for the drug enforcement donation account, totaling $3,018.21.
(Aug. to Record, Order for Rest. (etc.).) On appeal, Chongphaisane argues that there
was not sufficient evidence to support the district court's restitution award, and assumes
the only testimony and evidence the court could have considered was presented prior to
the prosecution initially resting its case at the February 15, 2012 hearing.

(See

Appellant's Brief, pp.24-27.) He contends that, without the presentation of evidence of
the other seven officers' specific rates of pay prior to the state initially resting, the district
court did not have sufficient evidence to support its restitution award. Chongphaisane's
argument fails because the testimony and evidence presented to the district court
provided a sufficient basis upon which it made its restitution award - with or without the
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additional testimony and evidence admitted after the state was allowed to reopen its
presentation of evidence.
For the reasons previously discussed, the district court acted within its discretion
by reopening the state's case to receive additional testimony and evidence. Based on
the total testimony and evidence presented to the court, there was substantial evidence
to support its restitution award.

During the restitution hearing, the state introduced

State's Exhibit 1, which listed and totaled the officers' (and Ms. Weddle's) hours spent
investigating Chongphaisane's case and requested restitution totaling $2,918.21. (St's
Ex. 1.) Ms. Weddle testified that when she prepared the restitution request, she applied
(multiplied) the rate of pay that was in effect for each officer on August 30 th of 2011 (the
date the search warrant was executed) by the officers' self-reported hours, which
resulted in $2,918.21. (2/15/12 Tr., p.23, L.16 - p.25, L.19; p.44, L.23 - p.45, L.6; p.51,
L.13 - p.52, L.20.) Officer Keely and Ms. Weddle testified to what their own hourly rates
of pay were, but were unable to say at the February 15, 2012 hearing what the rates of
pay were for the other seven members of law enforcement listed on the restitution
request. (2/15/12 Tr., p.6, L.19 - p.33, L.2.)

However, Ms. Weddle later provided the

court with two affidavits (February 21st and March 26 th of 2012) which listed the specific
pay rates for each officer for August 30, 2011.

(See R., pp.57-61; Aug. to Record,

3/26/12 Aff. of Laura Weddle; 2/15/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-11; p.44, L.23-p.45, L.6; 3/21/12
Tr., p.59, Ls.6-12.) The evidence and testimony presented to the district court provided
substantial evidence upon which to award $2,918.21, plus $100 to the drug
enforcement donation account, for a total restitution amount of $3,018.21.
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the only evidence the district court could have
properly considered was the evidence and testimony presented before the prosecution
initially rested its case, there was still substantial evidence presented by Ms. Weddle's
testimony to support the court's restitution award. 8
The heart of Chongphaisane's argument appears to be that there could not have
been substantial evidence to support the district court's restitution order without
evidence of what each of the officers' specific pay rates were at the time services were
rendered. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-27.) He contends, "[a]s such, both defense counsel
and the district court correctly noted, the State presented no evidence as to the rate of
pay for the other officers, and so failed to meet its prima facie burden in regard to its

8

Chongphaisane contends that (a) Ms. Weddle did not stake the officers' pay rates to
the day they performed investigative services on his case, and (b) the pay rates used by
Ms. Weddle may have been for higher rates than actually in effect at the time of the
investigation, stating. (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) However, Ms. Weddle was asked
during the initial phase of the February 15, 2012 restitution hearing, "And did you apply
the current ray [sic] of pay as of August 30 th of 2011 to each of these officers," and
responded, "Yes." (2/15/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.8-11.) Because the restitution hours requested
on behalf of the officers was for work done in executing the search warrant on August
30,· 2011, Ms. Weddle correctly applied each officer's "current rate of pay as of' that
day. (See id.) Likewise, in her "reopened" testimony on February 15, 2012, Ms.
Weddle was asked, "And in this case did you get an accurate rate of pay for each of the
officers listed on the spread sheet for August 3dh of 2011?," and she answered, "Yes, I
did."
(2/15/12 Tr., p.44, L.23 - p.45, L.3 (emphasis added).)
To the extent
Chongphaisane's argument is based upon his assertion that "Ms. Weddle did not get
the officer's [sic] rate of pay at the time they were working on the investigation, but at
some, unknown future point" (see Appellant's Brief, p.27), it is completely belied by the
record and must be rejected.
Further, the district court clarified with Ms. Weddle that, because she based the
officers' rates of pay upon her review of the latest quarterly payroll report released
before their investigation hours were performed, it was possible that a subsequent pay
raise for any officer would not have been reflected in her calculations, which could only
have benefitted Chongphaisane, and that "in no event" could her restitution request
have been based on a pay rate higher than an officer's actual pay rate at the time
investigation work was performed. (2/15/12 Tr., p.52, L.21 - p.53, L.16.)
17

claims for the salaries of those other officers." (Appellant's Brief, p.25.) Although the
district court noted that no specific testimony about the seven other officers' (i.e., apart
from Officer Keely and Ms. Weddle) pay rates was presented before the state rested,
the court did not opine that, without such testimony, the state could not meet is burden
of proof. (See 2/15/12 Tr., p.43, L.24 - p.44, L.9 (after the prosecutor said, "if Your
Honor does not think that is sufficient, I would move to reopen," the court said, "[a]II
right. You may reopen.")
Chongphaisane has not provided any authority to support his theory that the
district court had to have in-court testimony or evidence showing each of the officers'
rates of pay in order to award restitution for their investigation hours.

There is no

requirement that, in order to obtain restitution, the state had to present evidence at the
restitution hearing of the pay rate for each officer - vis-a-vis having Ms. Weddle testify
that she had earlier obtained and applied the officers' correct and relevant pay rates
when she computed restitution. Based on Ms. Weddle's testimony that, at the time she
prepared the state's restitution request, she had the officers' latest pay rates and
applied them to the hours worked, there was substantial evidence to support the district
court's restitution order - even without any additional testimony or affidavits by Ms.
Weddle. The court would have acted well within its discretion to order restitution based
upon Ms. Weddle's testimony that, when she prepared the restitution request, she
obtained and applied each of the officers' pay rates that were in effect at the time they
investigated the case.
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In sum, the district court's restitution award was supported by substantial
evidence, and Chongphaisane has failed to show any abuse in the court's discretion in
making that award.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
awarding restitution in the amount of $3,018.21.
DATED this 3 rd day of January, 2013.
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